Executive summary Background
Policy-makers have proposed replacing the current system of reservist participation with a new model, termed a Continuum of Service. This new paradigm is intended to give reservists the ability to move seamlessly between full-and part-time status. Furthermore, the intent of this new system is to rely on reservist volunteerism, by providing more options for participation at different levels of service.
The services must provide adequate incentives to encourage reservists to volunteer. It is likely that changes to the current compensation system will be necessary to facilitate an increase in volunteerism. Before making any changes, however, it is important to understand existing manning problems, as well as those that could arise as a result of a Continuum of Service. If the services wish to rely on reservists with already-low retention, increases in compensation for these groups would be necessary to prevent retention from falling any further. In addition, the skill sets, demographics, civilian opportunities, and military experience of these groups will affect the types of pay and benefits that DoD should offer.
Data and methodology
This paper analyzes information from the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) from FY00 to FY03 in order to identify existing, chronic, and potential manning challenges for each Reserve and Guard Component. These data contain detailed information on the demographics of the servicemembers, characteristics of their military service, and their retention decisions.
Although the RCCPDS provides us with a great deal of data, it also has significant limitations. Most significant is the inability to identify reservists who are activated, mobilized, or deployed. Consequently, we can identify only the existence of retention problems and not their underlying causes.
In designing a compensation system to support a Continuum of Service, policy-makers need to understand the primary determinants of retention. Consequently, we isolate and present the effect of different reservist characteristics on continuation behavior, using standard logistic regression models. This approach allows us to identify the areas in which retention is already low and in which an increase in participation might create significant manning problems.
Findings and implications
Using these data, it is not possible to identify whether reservists are activated, mobilized, or deployed at any point during the time period we examine. However, most of the Reserve and Guard Components experienced increases in retention from FY00 to FY03. Furthermore, state-level data suggest a small, positive relationship between mobilizations and continuation rates. These trends are notable because mobilizations and deployments have all increased over this time period. Conventional wisdom would suggest that this would contribute to more separations from the Reserves.
Relatively large military pay raises, a sagging domestic economy, and a renewed sense of patriotism have all been credited with increases in retention in the Active Components. It is probable that these factors have also contributed to increases in retention in the Reserve and Guard Components. Even if these causes have overshadowed the negative effect of mobilizations, however, DoD should not rely on this relationship to continue. Rather, it seems prudent for the services to have the flexibility and discretion to provide incentives for voluntary participation if and when they become necessary.
While overall retention is high and on the rise in most Components, there are still certain groups with low retention. The most junior enlisted paygrades, which represent over 40 percent of all enlisted personnel, have continuation rates well below 80 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, there is strong evidence that retirement benefits heavily influence retention decisions. Continuation rates are at their highest as servicemembers approach the point at which they become vested; once they become retirement-eligible, however, retention drops significantly. This suggests that changes in retirement benefits can significantly affect servicemember behavior and decisions to volunteer.
Retention also increases with level of education, until the point at which reservists obtain their degrees. It is probable that many people work toward their degrees while in the Reserves but choose to leave after finishing their education. If this is the case, changes in the level of educational benefits offered to reservists have the potential to influence volunteerism as well. However, the data also indicate that additional incentives may be necessary to retain servicemembers after they have obtained their degrees.
Finally, the data provide evidence that reservist retention varies with the strength of one's civilian earnings opportunities. Those with strong earnings potential in the labor market have some of the lowest continuation rates across the Reserve and Guard Components. At the other end of the spectrum, reservists with skills that typically command low salaries in the private sector have very high retention.
In establishing a Continuum of Service, then, it is likely that the pay/ benefits necessary to encourage volunteerism will differ by occupational specialty. This differential will be exacerbated if skills with strong civilian opportunities are those on which the services hope to rely for enhanced volunteerism. These specialties already have relatively low retention; efforts to elicit higher levels of participation will require even higher compensation.
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, each of the services has used reservists more frequently, for longer periods, and in more varied roles. Using reservists in new ways has necessitated cumbersome workarounds to the traditional model of reservist participation. Policy-makers have proposed replacing the current system with a new paradigm, termed a Continuum of Service. This new model of participation is intended to give reservists the ability to move seamlessly between full-and parttime status, depending on their specialties, civilian job commitments, and even geographic location. Such a system would rely on enhanced volunteerism by providing more options for participation.
Because the Continuum of Service is, in many ways, a significant departure from the past, policy-makers are uncertain whether existing compensation is sufficient to facilitate an increase in volunteerism. Consequently, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) has asked CNA to examine potential changes to the compensation system that would support a Continuum of Service.
Two economic principles should guide any attempt at compensation reform. First, reform should not be pursued for the sake of reform. Rather, changes to compensation should be in direct response to a specific problem faced by the services. For example, if the services are able to fully man reserve units, raising reservist pay is not a cost-effective response. If this is the case, while a pay increase might alleviate perceived inequities, it would not solve a tangible problem faced by the services.
Second, targeted pay is more efficient than across-the-board compensation. This principle is related to the first because targeted pay allows the services to address specific problem areas. In contrast, across-theboard compensation is paid to all servicemembers. Although acrossthe-board increases can alleviate specific manning problems, it also raises compensation in areas in which there is no problem. This increases the overall cost of addressing the problem, whereas targeted pay could achieve the same result at substantially lower cost.
Before recommending changes to reserve compensation, then, it is important to identify existing manning problems, as well as potential problems that could arise as a result of a Continuum of Service. The degree to which different skill sets are likely to be used in a new model is potentially useful in forming personnel policies and programs that encourage different levels of participation. Also, the degree to which these skill sets differ in terms of their retention, demographics, civilian opportunities, and military experience will affect the types of pay and benefits that DoD should offer.
Therefore, this paper analyzes information from the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS) in order to understand existing, chronic, and potential manning challenges for all Reserve and Guard Components as they move toward a Continuum of Service. While recent and current conditions do not necessarily indicate that problems will persist, they do offer the services some insight into manning challenges that have the potential to be highlighted in a new model of reserve participation.
Data
The data we use in our analysis come from the Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System (RCCPDS). These data allow us to construct continuation rates for FY00-03 and to disaggregate these continuation rates into both reenlistment rates (i.e., those who choose to remain in the Reserves past their current obligation) and attrition rates (i.e., those who leave the Reserves before their obligation is complete).
In addition, the RCCPDS provides us with detailed data on the demographic characteristics of the servicemember (such as gender, race/ ethnicity, and age) and on characteristics of their military service (paygrade, length of service, military specialty, geographic location, etc.). These additional data allow us to assess the degree to which attrition problems are concentrated within particular demographic groups, military specialties, or even geographic locations. 2 Although the RCCPDS contains a great deal of data on reservists and characteristics of their service, it also has significant limitations. Using these data, it is not possible to identify whether reservists are activated, mobilized, or deployed at any point during the fiscal year. Consequently, we are unable to assess the role that these events play in the decision of reservists to separate from the Reserve or Guard Component to which they belong. CNA is working with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (Manpower and Personnel) to create a database to analyze the impact of activation, mobilization, and deployment on attrition. In this analysis, however, we can identify only the existence of manning problems and not their underlying causes.
1. We thank Ms. Molly Wehrle at DMDC for her efforts with these data.
2. Reference [1] uses the RCCPDS in a similar fashion, examining quarterly Naval Reserve data from FY86 and FY87.
Retention in the Reserve and Guard Components
Continuation rates The continuation rates in table 1 are a weighted average of the retention decisions of enlisted personnel, commissioned officers, and warrant officers. In table 3, we calculate these rates separately for each of these three groups. With the exception of the Marine Forces and Coast Guard Reserve, continuation rates are higher for commissioned officers than for enlisted personnel; warrant officer retention is usually at or above that of commissioned officers. 3 Continuation rates are virtually the same in the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard-whether the servicemember is enlisted or a commissioned officer.
Trends in continuation rates
The FY00-03 data provide limited information on recent trends in continuation behavior. Most of the Components have experienced notable increases in retention over these past few years. For example, continuation rates in the Army Reserve rose from 80 percent in FY00 to over 84 percent in FY03; this increase was the result of increases for both officers and enlisted personnel. Furthermore, each Component experienced an increase in retention from FY02 to FY03, with the exception of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. 4 These trends are interesting because activations, mobilizations, and deployments have all increased over this time period. 5 Conventional wisdom would suggest that these events would contribute to more separations from the Reserves. The overall trends, however, are not consistent with this intuition.
Other factors influence continuation and have changed over this time period as well. Relatively large military pay raises, a sagging domestic economy, and a renewed sense of patriotism have all been credited with increases in retention in the Active Components [2, 3] . It is probable that these factors have also contributed to increases in retention in the Reserve and Guard Components.
An alternate explanation for the continuation rate is that people are affiliated with the Reserves because they wish to serve their country, and that deployments are the reason they remain in the Guard and Reserves. Reference [4] advances a similar explanation of the relationship between active duty deployments and reenlistment, suggesting that deployments provide servicemembers with an opportunity to update previously held "naive expectations." If these explanations are correct, one would expect that recent deployments have increased retention of reservists. 6 Even if this is the case, the services should not rely on a positive relationship between frequency/duration of involuntary deployment and subsequent reenlistment behavior. Rather, it seems prudent for the services to have the flexibility to address manning problems with compensation tools that are specifically tailored to address these problems. This gives the services the discretion to provide incentives for voluntary participation if and when they are necessary.
Reenlistment and attrition of enlisted personnel
For enlisted personnel, those who remain affiliated with the Selected Reserve can be decomposed into two groups on which policy-makers often focus: those who renew their contracts at the expiration of their service agreements, and those who leave SelRes before the expiration of their obligations. The proportion of those who renew their agreements is the reenlistment rate; the proportion of those under obligation who leave their Reserve or Guard Component is the attrition rate. The continuation rate is a weighted average of the reenlistment and attrition rates-the weights being the proportion of enlisted personnel who are eligible to reenlist within the fiscal year. 7 6. Reference [5] hypothesizes a similar explanation, noting that Navy attrition rose following the end of conflict in Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
7. Specifically, C = E*R + (1 -E)*(1 -A), where C is the continuation rate, E is the proportion eligible to reenlist, R is the reenlistment rate, and A is the attrition rate. Since we do not have eligibility data for all enlisted personnel, the reenlistment and attrition rates in It is important to note that this definition of attrition differs from that used by DoD. To measure attrition in the Reserve Components, DoD divides total losses in a given time frame by average strength over that same time period. A more comparable metric to the DoD measure of attrition is 100 minus the continuation rates presented in table 1. High (low) reenlistment is not always accompanied by low (high) attrition, however. For example, both the Naval and Coast Guard Reserve have higher reenlistment and higher attrition than the Army National Guard. The combination of simultaneously high attrition and reenlistment has a unique interpretation. High attrition means that servicemembers are leaving SelRes before the expiration of their obligated service; yet many of those who honor their commitments choose to remain in the Selected Reserve. In contrast, low attrition coupled with low reenlistment means that most people remain throughout their obligated service but choose to leave at the end of their commitments. 
A multivariate analysis of continuation behavior
Continuation rates vary over many dimensions, not just by Reserve and Guard Component or by enlisted, commissioned, or warrant officer. In designing a compensation system to support a Continuum of Service, policy-makers need to understand the primary determinants of retention. On one hand, if certain skill sets have already-low retention because of strong civilian opportunities, expectations of an increase in participation from these servicemembers are probably not realistic. In fact, one could argue that higher compensation for these groups is needed now to alleviate manning shortages. More frequent participation under a Continuum of Service would require a larger pay increase for these skill sets than those with already-high retention.
On the other hand, groups with below-average attrition are those from which DoD could expect a higher level of participation with relatively little additional pay. While more frequent activations, mobilizations, or deployments would be expected to raise attrition in these skill sets, retention is already high and a reduction would not create as severe a manning challenge as in those skill sets with strong civilian opportunities.
To better understand these primary determinants of retention, we use a standard logistic regression model 8 to isolate the effect of different reservist characteristics on continuation behavior. 9 Logistic regression is a common statistical technique to use when the behavior being studied is dichotomous (binary choice). In our model, the two outcomes are to "stay in" or to "leave" SelRes within a fiscal year. The logistic regression estimates the probability of remaining in the 8 . For a detailed explanation of the logistic model, see [6] .
9. For an example of this approach, see [7] .
Selected Reserve (equivalently, the proportion of those who remain in SelRes), holding constant a number of observable characteristics. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the data we have on reservists from RCCPDS. These are the variables that we use in our models of continuation behavior. Unless otherwise indicated, the data reflect the proportion of reservists in our data with a given characteristic.
In the following subsections, we present the relationships between several characteristics of a servicemember, his or her military service, and continuation behavior. Note, however, that we estimate a model that simultaneously controls for all these factors. This allows us to measure the independent effect of each characteristic on continuation.
For the bulk of our analysis, we focus on models that include members from all Reserve and Guard Components. When there are notable differences from one Component to the next, however, we will highlight those differences. In all other cases, the relationship between a given characteristic and continuation behavior is similar across all Components.
Paygrade
As table 3 showed, continuation rates are generally higher for commissioned and warrant officers than for enlisted personnel. For the enlisted paygrades, however, our multivariate analysis reveals that retention varies significantly by paygrade. Figure 1 displays predicted continuation rates by enlisted paygrade, holding all other characteristics constant. In general, continuation rates rise steadily by enlisted rank. Continuation rates for E-1s are around 63 percent, but they increase by paygrade until E-8, with continuation rates around 93 percent. Retention of E-9s is only slightly lower, at 92 percent.
In contrast, continuation rates for commissioned officers, shown in figure 2, have little variation by paygrade. Continuation rates vary between 84 and 91 percent, depending on paygrade. While retention of O-3s, O-4s, and O-5s is slightly higher than that of officers in other paygrades, there is no pronounced pattern by paygrade. The difference in retention by paygrade is even smaller for warrant officers (not shown). It is only the most junior enlisted paygrades (E-1 to E-4), then, that appear to have significantly low retention, with continuation rates below 80 percent. These junior personnel in the Reserve and Guard Components represent over 40 percent of all enlisted personnel. If the services wish to rely on these servicemembers in a Continuum of Service, significant changes in compensation will probably be necessary to encourage them to remain in the Selected Reserve. 

Continuation Rate
At the other end of the spectrum, more than 75 percent of all commissioned officers are in the O-3 to O-5 paygrades and have high levels of retention. Consequently, the services need to be less concerned about the retention impacts of the Continuum of Service on the seniority mix of officers. In other words, it is not likely that a new model of reservist participation will create a disproportionate manning challenge in the commissioned or warrant officer ranks.
Length of military service
Another dimension over which continuation rates vary significantly is the length of an individual's affiliation with the military. 10 To illustrate this point, figure 3 displays enlisted continuation rates by length of military service. 11 Continuation rates average between 83 and 90 percent until about 20 years of service, after which they drop significantly. This is not unexpected because people with 20 years of service qualify for retirement benefits. Consequently, there is a reduced incentive to remain a reservist after the 20-year point. In fact, it is notable that, of those with at least 25 years of service, over 70 percent choose to remain in the Selected Reserves.
10. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the length of service in the Reserve or Guard Component with which an individual is affiliated.
11. Data for commissioned and warrant officers display similar patterns. Furthermore, working conditions in the Reserve and Guard Components do not overshadow the draw of the military retirement system. As figure 3 shows, continuation rates at 13 to 17 years of service are higher than those of less experienced personnel. These are the servicemembers close to the point at which they become eligible for a military pension. While activations, mobilizations, and deployments may be affecting retention, it does not appear that the effect is so strong that many forgo a chance at receiving retirement benefits.
A comparison of continuation rates by age of servicemember leads to a similar conclusion. Enlisted continuation rates are generally high, between 80 and 90 percent, until the age of 55. In contrast, retention of those 55 years of age or older is only 76 percent.
These differences in retention by length of service have direct implications for a Continuum of Service. Given the demonstrable draw of the retirement system, the services can expect relatively high retention of those approaching the 20-year point, even at more frequent levels of participation. In addition, the "economic rent" of offering additional retirement benefits is probably high since many of these people would choose to stay in the Selected Reserve even without these benefits. If the premium to the services of additional experience is high enough, however, it might be cost-effective to consider compensation options that incentivize servicemembers to stay past the 20-year point.
Geographic location
A potentially important consideration in the decision to activate, mobilize, or deploy units is the geographic location in which that unit is based. On one hand, if certain regions of the country have persistent manning problems, mobilizing units from these states could exacerbate already low retention. Indeed, deployments from these regions over FY00-03 could be responsible for the low retention we observe in these areas. On the other hand, if there are more significant determinants of retention than geographic location, it is likely that a Continuum of Service could be supported with equal representation across the country. When adjusting for the skill mix and demographic characteristics of units, as well as the economic conditions in the states in which these units are based, the variation in retention by region is even smaller. However, each of the Reserve and Guard Components has different experiences in different regions of the country. In a given region, some Components will have relatively high retention, while others see low continuation rates.
To illustrate this point, table 7 displays, for each Reserve and Guard Component, the region in which the highest and lowest continuation rates are observed. These calculations are presented separately for enlisted personnel and for officers; in addition, we show the proportion of reservists in that Reserve or Guard Component whose units are based in that region. All of the differences in table 7 are "statistically significant," which means that we can state with confidence that these are true differences in retention, and not anomalies in a particular year. The regions with high (low) retention are similar for both officers and enlisted personnel in only a few cases. The Army Reserve has low retention in units based outside the United States and high continuation rates in the Northeast. The Air National Guard has low retention in the South and high continuation rates in units based outside the United States. Units outside the United States have the most variation in continuation rates: in 6 of 14 cases, the highest level of retention for a Component is in this region, but in 3 cases it also produces the lowest continuation rates.
Of particular concern are regions with low retention and a large number of personnel in units based within these regions. For example, over 20 percent of the Air National Guard is based in the South, where retention is lowest for this Component. However, a large proportion of Naval Reserve enlisted personnel are based in the South, where retention is highest; Air Force and Coast Guard Reserve units have a similar situation with officers in the Midwest.
Widespread regional manning difficulties, then, exist in only a few cases. This does not mean, however, that the services should ignore differences in retention at a more localized level. In fact, it is probable that there are areas within every region (e.g., states, counties, cities) that have difficulty consistently manning units. Unit affiliation bonuses could help ease these manning challenges, particularly as the services move toward a Continuum of Service. Where retention problems exist throughout a region, however, it is likely that widespread use of these compensation tools would help improve the manning situations.
Activations, mobilizations and deployments
Using the RCCPDS data, it is not possible to identify whether individual reservists are activated, mobilized or deployed at any point during the fiscal year. However, we do have supplemental data from DoD that allow us to identify the number of Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs), by Component and by state, from FY01 to FY03. 12 Using these data, we can assess the extent to which mobilizations and continuation rates vary by state, and can draw inferences about the effect of mobilization on individual retention behavior.
We find a small, positive relationship between the proportion of reservists in a state that are IMAs and the continuation rate in that state. Even after controlling for all the other observable characteristics of reservists that we have identified, there is no evidence that mobilizations lead to lower continuation rates. This statistical relationship is consistent with the trends in the aggregate data, where continuation rates have increased as the number of activations, mobilizations and deployments has risen. Again, we stress that the services should not rely on this positive relationship to proliferate; rather, it is recommended that the services have the flexibility to address emerging manning problems if and when they arise.
Local economic conditions
Given the nature of the data, we cannot separately identify the role of overall economic conditions vs. the general environment in the Reserves from one year to the next. However, we are able to examine the effect that local economic conditions have on retention. Using unemployment rates of the state in which a unit is based, we can assess the extent to which differences in the local economic environment affect continuation behavior.
In general, higher unemployment in a state is associated with higher retention. This finding is intuitive: in regions where civilian job opportunities are scarce, people are more likely to maintain their affiliation with the Selected Reserves. The magnitude of this relationship, however, is very small. A 1-percentage-point increase in unemployment (a sizable increase) increases continuation rates by only 0.2 percentage point. While local economic conditions do play a role in retention, then, they do not appear to be the primary drivers of the decision to remain in the Reserves.
13
Occupational specialty
The degree to which different skill sets are used in a Continuum of Service is an important consideration in forming personnel policies 13. The small but statistically significant effect of state-specific unemployment rates on continuation behavior is consistent with previous research [2] .
that encourage different levels of participation. As In establishing a Continuum of Service, then, it is likely that the pay/ benefits necessary to encourage volunteerism will differ by occupational specialty. Reservists with strong civilian opportunities already have relatively low retention; efforts to elicit higher levels of participation will require relatively higher compensation. In contrast, those with less favorable civilian opportunities have high retention and will probably not require as much compensation. Unfortunately, the RCCPDS data do not provide reliable information on the civilian occupation in which a reservist is employed. These data were not reported until after the beginning of FY00, so we do not have any civilian labor market data for the first year in our data. Data for FY01-03 are not substantively better; for over 90 percent of reservists, there is no civilian occupation recorded in the RCCPDS data. Consequently, we are unable to directly test whether reservists with high civilian earnings are more likely to leave the Selected Reserve.
Demographic characteristics
Finally, we examine the relationship between several individual characteristics and continuation behavior. The services are not likely to intentionally rely on particular demographic groups to support a Continuum of Service. However, it is important to understand the relationship between these characteristics and retention, since different demographic groups may participate at different levels in the Continuum of Service. For example, if level of education is positively correlated with continuation behavior, offering educational benefits as an incentive to increase levels of participation can have a secondary benefit of increases in retention. Furthermore, if different demographic groups are disproportionately affected by activations, mobilizations, and deployments, any differences in retention can be exacerbated.
It is well known that demographic characteristics are some of the strongest determinants of civilian economic opportunities [8] . A possible interpretation of the effect of these characteristics is that they reflect a combination of two factors: relative economic opportunity, and relative preference for military service. 14 While it is not possible to separately identify these two effects, it is possible to see differences in continuation behavior by demographic group, even if there is no inherent difference in preference for the military. Similarly, it is possible to observe no demographic difference in retention, even if groups have substantially different economic opportunities.
Differences in continuation by gender, marital status, and race/ethnicity are consistent with this latter explanation, as they are very small in magnitude. For example, men are 0.4 percentage point more likely to stay in the Selected Reserve than women; married reservists are only 1.3 percentage points more likely to stay than those without spouses. Hispanics have continuation rates that are about 1.3 percentage points higher than those of blacks, whites, and all other racial/ethnic groups. Among these latter three groups, there are no significant differences in retention, despite well-known differences in civilian earnings opportunities.
More significant differences in retention are found at different levels of education. Table 10 presents differences in retention by educational attainment. Individuals without high school degrees have continuation rates around 82 percent, while those with diplomas (and no further education) have continuation rates of slightly more than 84 percent.
Reservists with some college education have the highest level of retention. Many may be pursuing their college degrees while affiliated with the Selected Reserves; unfortunately, our data do not allow us to test this assumption. In contrast, reservists with at least a college degree have slightly lower retention than those with some college education. This is consistent with the notion that people acquire their college degrees while in the Reserves but choose to leave after finishing their education. It is also consistent with the sizable wage premium paid to college graduates in the private sector [8] . 
Conclusions and implications
Before recommending changes to reserve compensation, it is important to identify existing manning problems, as well as potential manning problems that could arise as a result of a Continuum of Service.
Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, each of the services has used reservists more frequently, for longer periods of time, and in more varied roles. To a certain extent, then, recent data provide us with an opportunity to observe how activations, mobilizations, and deployments have affected retention in the Reserve and Guard Components.
Unfortunately, it is not possible with existing data to specifically identify people who have been directly affected by this increasing reliance on reservists. We hope that data will soon be available that will allow this next step. In the meantime, we are unable to directly assess the role that these events play in the decision to separate from the Reserve and Guard Components. However, these existing data offer some insight into manning challenges that have the potential to be highlighted or exacerbated in a new model of reserve participation.
With data from FY00 to FY03, we have limited information on recent trends in continuation behavior. Most of the Components have experienced notable increases in retention over these past few years; most Components have also seen a steady decrease in attrition over the same time period. These trends are interesting, given the prevalence of mobilizations over the past few years. It is probable that a combination of an unhealthy civilian economy, sizable increases in military compensation, and a surge in patriotism have all overshadowed any effects of higher mobilization rates.
If this is the case, the services should not rely on a continued, positive relationship between frequency/duration of involuntary deployment and subsequent reenlistment behavior. Rather, it is prudent for the services to have the flexibility to address manning problems with compensation tools specifically tailored to address these problems.
While overall retention is high, there are still certain groups with notably lower retention. The most junior enlisted paygrades (E-1 to E-4) have significantly low retention, with continuation rates below 80 percent. While these are the most junior personnel in the Reserve and Guard Components, they do represent over 40 percent of all enlisted personnel. At the other end of the spectrum, reservists with more than 20 years of military service have low retention since there is reduced incentive to remain a reservist after the 20-year point.
There is surprisingly little variation in retention by demographic characteristics of the individual. One notable exception is differences by educational attainment. Retention increases with level of education until the point at which reservists obtain their college degrees. It is likely that many reservists work toward their degrees while in the Reserves, but choose to leave after finishing their education. It is also consistent with the services' inability to compete with the private sector for highly educated people.
Widespread regional retention differences exist in only a few cases. This does not mean, however, that the services should ignore differences in retention at a more localized level. In fact, it is probable that there are areas within every region that have difficulty consistently manning units. Having the flexibility to address these challenges at the unit level would help the services with retention.
Finally, our data provide some evidence that retention varies by the strength of one's civilian earnings opportunities. In establishing a Continuum of Service, then, it is likely that the compensation necessary to encourage volunteerism will differ by occupational specialty.
Reservists with strong civilian opportunities have low retention and will require more compensation to elicit higher levels of participation than those with less favorable employment opportunities. 
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